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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT LILETH SHELLEY 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to the provisions 
of Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Ann. (1988). This matter is an 
appeal from a final order of the Industrial Commission wherein 
compensation was awarded to the Respondent. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The Respondent submits that there are no specific determinative 
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, or rules in 
connection with this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent does not have any major disagreements with the 
facts as cited by the Appellant in its brief. However, it may be 
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helpful to stress what Respondent deems to be important in the 
Court's consideration of the facts: 
1. Respondent Lileth Shelley was 50 years old at the time of 
the 1985 industrial injury in question. At that time she had 
been employed by the Appellant for over 13 years as a warehouse 
worker. (R. at 2, 33, 34.) 
2. The 1985 injury occurred while Mrs. Shelly was twisting on 
a ladder and lifting a 3 5 lb. box of shower curtains over the 
protective railing of the ladder. (R. at 35, 36.) 
3. Mrs. Shelley had sustained two prior low back injuries, 
both occurred while on the job and while employed by the 
Appellant. The first was in 1975 and occurred while she was 
lifting a 35 to 40 lb. cases of shoes. (R. at 62) The second 
low back injury occurred in 1978 when Mrs. Shelley was bending 
over a waist high case containing boxes of tightly packed 
underwear. As she was struggling to remove the boxes from the 
case, she felt her back pop. (R. at 54.) 
4. The Respondent received medical treatment from Dr. Harold 
P. Hargreaves for each of the two prior injuries. She was also 
treated by Dr. Allred after the 1978 injury and wore a corset for 
about five months following this injury. She testified that 
after these injuries, she occasional problems with her back. (R. 
at 55, 306.) 
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5. Mrs. Shelley's medical history shows no other prior 
injuries to her back, that she had not experienced any problems 
with her back prior to the 1975 industrial accident. The medical 
records further give no indication of any disease or back problem 
of any kind prior to the 1975 injury. (R. at 52, 52, 69, 71, 161, 
162. ) 
6. Mrs. Shelley's treating physicians after the 1985 injury, 
Dr. S. William Allred, and Dr. J. Charles Rich, diagnosed Mrs. 
Shelley as having a pre-existing condition in 1985 of 
degenerative spondylolisthesis, a condition which is often 
started by trauma to the back. This was attributed to the prior 
work injuries. (R. at 102, 217, 270, 272.) 
7. Mrs. Shelley was rated by both Dr. Allred as having a 25% 
whole body impairment with 12 1/2% due to the 1985 injury and 12 
1/2% due to the pre-existing problem. (R. at 102.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mrs. Shelley sustained an injury on the job in May of 1985. 
Prior to that date, she had had two other back injuries, both of 
which were job related. She had not had had any back trouble 
prior to the first industrial injury in 1975. 
The record shows that the Industrial Commission had substantial 
evidence upon which to base the finding that Mrs. Shelley's pre-
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existing condition as of 1985 was due to prior industrial 
injuries incurred while employed by the same employer. 
The Allen decision does not conflict with the determination by 
the Commission that, for purposes of the initial issue of whether 
a compensable accident has occurred, a pre-existing condition due 
to prior work injuries incurred while in the employ of the same 
employer does not require use of the higher legal standard of 
legal causation set forth in Allen. This is true, in part, 
because in such a situation, the employee does bring a personal 
risk to the workplace. Rather, with the workplace as the cause 
of all related impairment, there is no basis on which to excuse 
the employer from liability for the final injury. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT'S 
PRE-EXISTING BACK CONDITION IS DUE TO WORK INJURIES IS 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
It is not disputed that Mrs. Shelley had a pre-existing 
condition at the time of her 1985 industrial accident. It is 
also not disputed that, under the facts as found by the 
Industrial Commission, Mrs. Shelley's activities at the time of 
the accident did not meet the extra exertion requirements of 
Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
However, the Commission also found that Mrs. Shelley's pre-
existing condition was the result of prior industrial accidents 
incurred while employed by the same employer. 
In this appeal, the main issue before this Court is whether an 
injured worker must show unusual or extraordinary exertion in 
order to establish legal causation when the pre-existing 
condition is due to prior industrial accidents that occurred 
while working for the same employer. 
The Commissioners of the Industrial Commission found that the 
higher legal causation standard as set forth in the Allen 
decision need not be met when the pre-existing condition is due 
to problems brought on by prior industrial accidents suffered 
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while the employee was working for the same employer. The 
reasoning set forth by the Commission in its final order is sound 
and should be ratified by this Court. 
THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION 
First, the Commission considered the evidence concerning the 
origin of the pre-existing condition in order to determine 
whether it was due to on-the-job injuries or non-industrial 
causes. 
On appeal, this Court must consider whether there is 
substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's 
determination that Mrs. Shelley's pre-existing condition arose 
due to prior job related injuries. U.C.A., 1953, Section 35-1-85, 
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306 
(Utah 1985). This is the proper standard of review inasmuch as 
this case was commenced in May of 1987, before the effective date 
of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 63-46b-l to -22, UCA 
(1988 Supp). 
There is no evidence in the record to show that Mrs. Shelley 
suffers from any congenital back problem nor that she had any 
problems that pre-dated her first back injury in 1975. 
At the evidentiary hearing, she testified that the first 
injury to her back occurred at work in 1975 (R. at 52). Mrs• 
Shelley also testified that she had not had a problem with her 
back prior to the 1975 injury (R. at 69). Her testimony does not 
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reveal any back problems other than those ensuing after her three 
industrial injuries. 
The medical records from the Respondent's treating physicians 
further support this. For example, in the records of Dr. Harold 
Hargreaves, M.D., an x-ray summary for a film taken in 1975 
states "Lumbar spine normal." (R. at 162). His records do not 
show anything relating to the back prior to 1975, although the 
Respondent had seen him first in February of 1969 (R. at 161). 
The records of Dr. Kenneth Guymon mention a work injury to the 
back in May of 1978 and a previous back injury three years before 
(the 1975 injury) (R. at 171). Although he treated various ills 
beginning in 1972, there is nothing in Dr. Guymon's records to 
suggest of prior back problems. 
In a letter dated June 13, 1985, Dr. J. Charles Rich, M.D., 
Mrs. Shelley's neurologist, stated, "...the only episodes of back 
pain she has ever had (have) been those related not only with 
work but with this same employer over the course of the last few 
years. " (R. at 217). 
Dr. Rich, in an operative report dated 7/23/85, stated, as to 
preoperative and post operative diagnoses, "L5-S1 disk herniation 
and degenerative spondylolisthesis." (R. at 270). 
Degenerative spondylolisthesis is the slipping of one 
vertebra over another due to degenerative processes (ie. the 
result of trauma) rather than due to congenital defects. 
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Dr. William Allred, M.D., the treating orthopedic surgeon, 
stated in the 7/31/85 discharge summary of a finding of "L5-S1 
central disc defect with a bilateral nerve root compression L4-5 
and mild degenerative Pseudo-spondylolisthesis." (R. at 272). 
Further, Dr. Allred's 1987 Summary of Medical Record indicates a 
50/50 apportionment between pre-existing conditions and the 1985 
industrial injury. In responding to a question of aggravation he 
stated as follows: 
10. Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-
existing condition? Please explain as necessary. 
Yes. The patient had had two previous episodes of back pain 
of brief duration. 
(R. at 102). 
In connection with the claim and after the evidentiary 
hearing, the Appellant hired Dr. David Beck to examine Mrs. 
Shelley. Dr. Beck, who saw the Respondent only once, stated the 
opinion that the 1975 and 1978 injuries probably have no bearing 
on Mrs. Shelley's long-term problem. He apparently attributed 
the pre-existing portion of the back problem to other origins. 
However, this is just Dr. Beck's opinion and it is not supported 
by any explanation or evidence (R. at 293, 294). 
The Commission, as stated in its final order, found no 
evidence in the record to show that any of Mrs. Shelley's back 
problems were due to congenital defects or anything pre-dating 
the first industrial injury of 1975. Rather, it found ample 
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reasons for the factual conclusion that the pre-existing problems 
in Mrs. Shelley's back are due to the prior work injuries (R. at 
334) . 
Thus, it is seen that the Commission's conclusion that the 
pre-existing condition of the lower back was due to the prior 
industrial accidents incurred while working for the same employer 
is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSION IS 
CONSISTENT WITH THE HOLDING IN ALLEN 
The Appellant urges that the principles adopted by the Court 
in Allen v. Industrial Commission, supra, do not support the 
conclusions reached by the Commission in this matter. However, 
Appellant's analysis is flawed and is incorrect. 
In Allen the Utah Supreme Court adopted a test which requires, 
in the context of legal causation, that a claimant with a pre-
existing condition show that the injury resulted from extra 
exertion. A worker without a pre-existing condition does not 
have to meet the higher standard. The reason stated for the 
extra exertion requirement was to determine whether "the employee 
brings to the workplace a personal element of risk such as a pre-
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existing condition." Allen at 25. The Court stated that the 
adoption of a higher standard of legal causation in such a case 
would serve to "offset the pre-existing condition of the employee 
as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for 
impairment resulting from a personal risk rather than exertion at 
work." Allen at 25. (Emphasis added). 
Where the medical evidence shows that an injured worker's 
problems are directly related to the work injury in question, 
legal causation should not be defeated on the pretext of a pre-
existing injury where it is established that such pre-existing 
injury was created in the same workplace in which the accident in 
question occurred. The worker in such a situation does not bring 
any personal element of risk to the workplace. 
Hence, where a worker brings no pre-existing injury to the 
workplace, but has a compensable injury (or injuries) on the job, 
and subsequently while on the job sustains an otherwise 
compensable injury to the same area of the body, he should not 
have to meet the higher legal standard to establish 
compensability, if the injury was incurred while working for the 
same employer. This is because the worker's increased risk of 
injury with respect to the later claim is attributable strictly 
to the hazards previously encountered at that same employment. 
In such a situation, the purposes for invoking the higher 
legal causation standard do not apply. There is no reason to 
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shelter the employer from liability for the last injury. The 
language and reasoning of Allen do not mandate a different 
conclusion, but in fact support it. 
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POINT III 
THE TORGERSON AND OTVOS CASES ARE NOT APPLICABLE 
TO THIS CASE 
The Appellant has argued that the holding in Richfield Care 
Center v. Torgerson, 733 P.2d 178 (Utah 1987) would be summarily 
reversed by affirming the Industrial Commission's order in this 
case. A reading of Torgerson shows this claim to be incorrect 
and without merit. 
In fact, in Torgerson the Court upheld the Commission's 
finding that the claimant therein had met the higher legal 
causation test. Hence, the Court did not reach, nor need to 
reach, the question of how the pre-existing condition there would 
impact on causation if the unusual exertion standard had not been 
met. 
The question of apportionment in Torgerson, wherein there were 
three back injuries, two of which were industrial, is 
inapplicable in this case. Further, unlike in Torgerson, herein 
no claim was made concurrent with the last accident for permanent 
physical impairment compensation for the prior industrial 
accidents. (In fact, the eight year statute of limitations had 
expired on the 1975 and 1978 accidents by the time the claim in 
question was filed). 
Conversely, apportionment in this case is not an issue. 
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Appellant also cites Otvos v. Industrial Commission, 751 P.2d 
263 (Utah App. 1988) in support of its contention that the 
Industrial Commission's order should not be upheld. 
A readincj of Otvos, however, shows that it does not even deal 
with the question of legal causation. Rather, the issues therein 
dealt with whether certain impairments could be combined to meet 
minimum threshold requirements for payment of permanent partial 
disability compensation under the Combined Injury Statute, 35-1-
69, Utah Code Ann. It does not have any application in this 
case. 
POINT IV 
AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY/ RESPONSIBILITY BEST RESTS WITH 
THE EMPLOYER WITH WHOM THE DISABILITY BEGAN 
Were the Court to not uphold the Commission's determination in 
this matter, the results would distinctly damage the interests 
of injured workers. In such a case, workers whose bodies are 
injured by prior industrial accidents could be foreclosed from 
receiving compensation from their employers for subsequent 
injuries that are the final blow to an already weakened back, or 
knee, or other part of the body, but that don't meet the higher 
legal causation standard due to the work-related pre-existing 
condition. 
It would be analogous to the vase, previously cracked by an 
accident, which continues to hold water until a final incident 
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shatters it. Perhaps, without the pre-existing cracks, the vase 
would not have shattered. However, if all the damage was done by 
the same party, such individual or employer should not be excused 
from liability for the final blow just because the last act did 
not involve usual exertion or activity. 
The Appellant argues that as a matter of public policy, this 
Court should not uphold the Industrial Commission's analysis. 
However, there are sound reasons why, as a matter of policy, 
protection should be extended to the worker with pre-existing 
current-job related injuries. The matter is perhaps best 
answered with a question: Who but the employer is in the best 
position to assume the costs of an injury that is an aggravation 
of a pre-existing work related disease? 
The issue before this Court does not involve the question of 
apportionment for the pre-existing versus current injury 
impairment. Such is adequately handled by existing statutes and 
court holdings. The issue here is only one of standards for 
legal causation. 
CONCLUSION 
The record fully supports the action taken by the Industrial 
Commission. The Commission did not act arbitrarily or abuse its 
discretion in finding Mrs. Shelley's pre-existing condition to be 
16 
job related. Accordingly,its determination should not be set 
aside on appeal. 
The Commission was justified under the philosophy of the Allen 
decision to find that the higher legal standard of causation need 
not be satisfied when the worker brings no personal risk to the 
workplace, but suffers from a pre-existing job-related injury at 
the time of the final injury. This policy should be ratified by 
the Court. 
This Court should affirm the action of the Industrial 
Commission and uphold the award of compensation to Mrs. Shelley. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day~X)f April, 1990. 
Phillip B. Shelj. ) \ 
Day & Barney 
Attorneys for Respondent Shelley 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Order Granting Motion for Review 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 87000483 
* 
LILETH SHELLEY, * 
Applicant, * ORDER GRANTING 
VS. * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
FRED MEYER, LIBERTY MUTUAL * 
INSURANCE COMPANY, and THE * 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND, * 
Defendants. * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah on Motion of the applicant, Lileth 
Shelley, reviews the Order of the Administrative Law Judge in the above 
entitled matter dated July 13, 1989, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
An Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial Commission in an Order 
dated July 13, 1989, denied the applicants claim for compensation under the 
Utah Workers Compensation Act, holding that the claimant, Lileth Shelley, 
failed to carry her burden of proof in establishing that she had received an 
industrial injury. The Administrative Law Judge based his decision on the 
fact that the applicant was unable to show any unusual or extraordinary 
exertion to establish legal causation as required under Allen vs Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1989), because of the applicant's pre-existing 
lower back condition. The applicant filed a Motion for Review which was 
received by the Industrial Commission on August 11, 1989, arguing that the 
applicant in this case should net be required to meet the higher standard of 
unusual or extraordinary exertion in order to establish legal causation 
because her pre-existing conditions were the result of previous industrial 
injuries received while employed by the same employer. 
The applicant, Lileth Shelley, worked for Defendant, Fred Meyer or 
its predecessor, Grand Central Stores, for thirteen (13) years. She was 
injured in industrial accidents while working for this employer in 1975, and 
1978, injuring her lower back each time. Although the claimant did not 
require continuing medical treatment as the result of these injuries, she 
testified at the hearing that her problems following the 1975 accident never 
entirely resolved. The 1975 and 1978 injuries were accepted as industrial 
injuries and benefits, including medical expenses, were paid by the 
applicant's employer. 
LILETH SHELLEY 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
In this case, the applicant suffered an injury on the job on May 3, 
1985. She was working in the warehouse for the employer, Fred Meyer, and had 
climbed a ladder and lifted a box of shower curtains weighing approximately 
thirty five pounds over a twelve or eighteen inch barrier and then climbed 
down the ladder with them. Shortly after reaching the bottom of the ladder 
she felt an onset of pain in her lower back. The applicant sought medical 
attention and unsuccessfully tried to resolve her back problems with 
conservative treatment. 
Further examination revealed that she had a disc herniation 
centrally at the L5-S1 level and a soft tissue bulge at the L4-L5 level. The 
claimant eventually received surgery for relief of these problems including a 
failed attempt to fuse her back at two levels. She then received a second 
surgery to fuse her back at two levels which was successful. Thereafter, her 
treating physician, Dr. Allred rated her at a twenty-five percent (257«) 
impairment of the whole person with 12.5% due to the 1985 accident and 12.5% 
due to the 1975 and 1978 injuries. The claimant's testimony and the records 
of Dr. Rich state that the only episodes of back pain the applicant has ever 
had were those related to her work with the same employer. Following the 
hearing in this matter the defendants obtained leave of the Commission to 
conduct an independent medical exam by Dr. David Beck. Dr. Beck concurred in 
the twenty-five percent (25%) impairment rating of Dr. Allred, also 
attributing one-half to the 1985 industrial accident and the other half to 
"pre-existing conditions including disease." In Dr. Beck's report he states, 
"I feel that the injuries of 1975 and 1978 probably have no bearing on her 
long term problem." However, Dr. Beck does not provide any explanation for 
the claimant's herniated disc other than her previous industrial injuries, and 
there is no evidence in the record to show that any of her back problems 
pre-date her industrial injuries. In reviewing the medical records the 
Commission finds no indication of any congenital back problems that pre-date 
her industrial injuries or other injuries to the claimant's back other than 
the industrial injuries received while working for the same employer. The 
medical records indicate that the calcification of the applicant's herniation 
show that the herniation was not of recent origin and, therefore, was not 
caused by the 1985 accident but rather by an earlier injury to the applicant's 
back. The testimony of the applicant and the records are clear that the 
applicant has at no time received an injury to her back except from the 
previous industrial accidents while working for the same employer. The 
Commission, therefore, finds that the pre-existing condition of the lower back 
from which the applicant was suffering was due to the 1975 and 1978 industrial 
accidents while working for the same employer. 
The Commission finds that the issue for determination in this case is 
whether the applicant's pre-existing condition, which were the result of 
previous accidents while employed by the same employer, requires the 
application of the higher standard for determining legal causation as 
annunciated by the Supreme Court in Allen. In other words, must the applicant 
show unusual or extraordinary exertion in order to establish legal causation 
where the pre-existing conditions from which she was suffering were the result 
of industrial accidents that occurred while working for the same employer? 
LILETH SHELLEY 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
In determining whether an employee has suffered a compensable injury 
a determination must be made as to whether that injury was by "accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment." The Supreme Court in the 
Allen case requires us first to determine whether there was an accident. The 
Court in that case defines accident as "an unexpected or unintended occurrence 
that may be the cause or the result of an injury." In this case the 
applicant, Lileth Shelley, did suffer an accident, as the injury to her back 
was certainly an unexpected result of her activity. The Court then requires 
us to determine whether a causal connection exists between the injury and the 
worker's employment duties. To determine causation requires a two-part 
analysis. One part is a medical question. That is, was the strain or 
exertion of the employment duties medically related to the injury suffered by 
the applicant? The medical records in this case seem clear that the problems 
experienced by the applicant were directly related to her current employment 
duties. The other part of the analysis requires a determination of legal 
causation. That is, was the exertion sufficient to be determined the legal 
cause of the injury to the applicant? The Allen Court stated that in a case 
where there is no pre-existing condition "usual exertion" would be sufficient 
to satisfy the legal causation test. However, the Court stated that in cases 
that involve pre-existing conditions a higher test, one requiring the showing 
of unusual or extraordinary exertion, must be met in order to show legal 
causation. 
The question in this case is whether the applicant, who has a 
pre-existing condition which is the result of previous industrial injuries 
received while working with the same employer, require the application of this 
higher standard? In the Allen case the Court justified the higher standard 
for persons with a pre-existing conditions by stating its purpose was to 
determine whether the employee brings to the work place a personal element of 
risk such as a pre-existing condition and that the higher standard would serve 
"to offset the pre-existing condition of the employee as the likely cause of 
the injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairment resulting from a 
personal risk rather than exertions at work." (emphasis added). Allen vs 
Industrial Commission, id. at 25. 
In applying the requirements of Allen to the instant case, the 
Commission finds that the purpose for requiring the higher standard of those 
with pre-existing conditions does not apply in cases where the pre-existing 
conditions are the result of industrial accidents previously suffered while in 
the employment of the same employer. An individual who undertakes employment 
bringing with him no "personal risk" from pre-existing conditions who then 
suffers an industrial accident involving "ordinary exertion" would be found to 
have received a compensable injury. If later that same employee, now impaired 
because of the first industrial accident, suffers a second industrial accident 
involving the same area of the body, he still brings to his employment no 
"personal risk" but rather an increased risk of injury that is attributable 
strictly to the hazards encountered at that employment. In this type of 
situation the stated purposes for application of the higher legal standard do 
not exist. The Commission, therefore, finds that the higher legal causation 
standard should not be applied in cases where the pre-existing condition is a 
LILETH SHELLEY 
ORDER 
PAGE FOUR 
result of previous industrial accidents suffered while the applicant was 
employed with the same employer responsible for the most recent accident. 
Here, the applicants pre-existing condition resulted from a risk associated 
with her employment with Fred Meyer and/or its predecessor, Grand Central 
Stores, thus there is no reason to shelter the employer from liability for 
that injury. 
The Commission finds that the applicant, Lileth Shelley, did sustain 
a compensable injury by accident during the course of her employment on May 3, 
1985, while employed by the defendant employer, Fred Meyer. The period of 
temporary total disability resulting from the May 3, 1985, injury was from May 
4, 1985, to and including April 30, 1987. 
Also, the Commission finds that the applicant is suffering from a 
permanent physical impairment of 25% of the whole man. Of this 25%, 12,5% is 
attributable to the industrial injury of May 3, 1985, and the remaining 12.5% 
is due to the pre-existing conditions caused by the two prior industrial 
injuries, in 1975 and 1978, while working for the same employer. 
In addition, the Commission finds that the low back injuries of 1975 
and 1978 are the cause of the pre-existing conditions of record. 
All other Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law Judge, not found 
contrary to the Commission's findings above, are adopted by the Commission as 
its own. 
ORDER 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the order of the Administrative Law 
Judge is hereby reversed and the Motion for Review of the Applicant is hereby 
granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Fred Meyer, and/or Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company pay the Applicant, Lileth Shelley, temporary total 
compensation at the rate of $240.00 per week from May 4, 1985 to April 30, 
1987, inclusive, for a period of 103.857 weeks for a total of $24,925.68, less 
attorney's fees as awarded herein below. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant, Fred Meyer, and/or Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company pay to the Applicant the sum of $8,073.00 for 12.5% 
permanent partial impairment of the whole person at the rate of $207.00 per 
week for 39 weeks, commencing May 1, 1987. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Employers Reinsurance Fund pay to the 
Applicant the sum of $8,073.00 for 12.5% permanent partial impairment of the 
whole person for pre-existing conditions at the rate of $207.00 per week for 
39 weeks, commencing January 29, 1988. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Defendants, Fred Meyer and/or Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company pay interest on the amount awarded herein, at the 
rate of 8% per annum from the date each benefit payment would otherwise become 
due and payable pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-78. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants, Fred Meyer and/or Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company pay to Phillip B. Shell, attorney for the applicant, 
the sum of $6,357.17 for services rendered in this matter, the same to be 
deducted from the award of temporary total compensation to the applicant and 
remitted directly to Phillip B. Shell. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Fred Meyer and/or Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Company pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of 
the industrial accident of May 3, 1985, said expenses to be paid in accordance 
with the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Industrial Commission of 
Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Employers Reinsurance Fund of Utah 
reimburse Fred Meyer and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company fifty percent 
(50%) of all temporary total disability and medical expenses incurred by 
Defendants, Fred Meyer and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Company as a result of 
the industrial accident of May 3, 1985. 
Any appeal shall be to the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty (30) 
days of the date hereof pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 
35-1-86 and Utah Code Ann., Section 63-461^16, 
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